1818: U.S. v. Bevans, 16 U.S.336.
Establishes two separate jurisdictions within the United States Of
America: 1. The "federal zone" and 2. "the 50 States". The I.R.C.
only has jurisdiction within the "federal zone". "The exclusive
jurisdiction which the United States have in forts and dock-yards
ceded to them, is derived from the express assent of the states by
whom the cessions are made. It could be derived in no other manner;
because without it, the authority of the state would be supreme and
exclusive therein," 3 Wheat., at 350, 351.
1883: Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746.
Defines labor as property, and the most sacred kind of property.
"Among these unalienable rights, as proclaimed in the Declaration of
Independence is the right of men to pursue their happiness, by which
is meant, the right any lawful business or vocation, in any manner not
inconsistent with the equal rights of others, which may increase their
prosperity or develop their faculties, so as to give them their
highest enjoyment...It has been well said that, THE PROPERTY WHICH
EVERY MAN HAS IS HIS OWN LABOR, AS IT IS THE ORIGINAL FOUNDATION OF
ALL OTHER PROPERTY SO IT IS THE MOST SACRED AND INVIOLABLE..."
1894: Caha v. United States, 152 U.S. 211. Restricts jurisdiction
of the federal government inside the states. "The law of Congress in
respect to those matters do not extend into the territorial limits of
the states, but have force only in the District of Columbia, and other
places that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the national
1895: Pollack v. Farmer's Loan and Trust Company, 157 U.S. 429, 158
U.S. 601. Prohibits direct taxes on the income of individuals.
1900: Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41. Defines the meaning of
"direct taxes". "Direct taxes bear immediately upon persons, upon the
possession and enjoyment of rights; indirect taxes are levied upon the
happening of an event as an exchange."
1901: Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244. Establishes that
constitutional limits on the Congress do not apply within the "federal
zone" and described where they do apply. "CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS
AND LIMITATIONS [Bill of Rights] WERE NOT APPLICABLE to the areas of
lands, enclaves, territories, and possessions over which Congress had
EXCLUSIVE LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION"
1906: Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43. Defined the distinction between
natural persons and corporations as it pertains to 5th Amendment
protections within the U.S. Constitution.
"...we are of the opinion that there is a clear distinction in this
particular between an individual and a corporation, and that the
latter has no right to refuse to submit its books and papers for an
examination at the suit of the state. The individual may stand upon
his constitutional rights as a citizen. He is entitled to carry on
his private business in his own way. His power to contract is
unlimited. He owes no duty to the state or to his neighbors to
divulge his business, or to open his doors to an investigation, so far
as it may tend to criminate him. He owes no such duty to the state,
since he receives nothing therefrom, beyond the protection of his life
and property. His rights are such as existed by the law of the land
long antecedent to the organization of the state, and can only be
taken from him by due process of law, and in accordance with the
Constitution. Among his rights are a refusal to incriminate himself,
and the immunity of himself and his property from arrest or seizure
except under a warrant of the law. He owes nothing to the public so
long as he does not trespass upon their rights.
Upon the other hand, the corporation is a creature of the state. It
is presumed to be incorporated for the benefit of the public. It
receives certain special privileges and franchises, and holds them
subject to the laws of the state and the limitations of its charter.
Its powers are limited by law. It can make no contract not authorized
by its charter. Its rights to [201 U.S. 43, 75] act as a corporation
are only preserved to it so long as it obeys the laws of its creation.
There is a reserved right in the legislature to investigate its
contracts and find out whether it has exceeded its powers. It would
be a strange anomaly to hold that a state, having chartered a
corporation to make use of certain franchises, could not, in the
exercise of its sovereignty, inquire how these franchises had been
employed, and whether they had been abused, and demand the production
of the corporate books and papers for that purpose. The defense
amounts to this: That an officer of a corporation which is charged
with a criminal violation of the statute, may plead the
criminality of such corporation as a refusal to produce its books. To
state this proposition is to answer it. While an individual may
lawfully refuse to answer incriminating questions unless protected by
an immunity statute, it does not follow that a corporation, vested
with special privileges and franchises, may refuse to show its hand
when charged with an abuse of such privileges. "
1911: Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107. Defined excise taxes
as taxes laid on corporations and corporate privileges, not in natural
persons. "Excises are taxes laid upon the manufacture, sale or
consumption of commodities within the country, upon licenses to pursue
certain occupations and upon corporate privileges...the requirement to
pay such taxes involves the exercise of [220 U.S. 107, 152]
privileges, and the element of absolute and unavoidable demand is
lacking...Conceding the power of Congress to tax the business
activities of private corporations.. the tax must be measured by some
standard...It is therefore well settled by the decisions of this court
that when the sovereign authority has exercised the right to tax a
legitimate subject of taxation as an exercise of a franchise or
privilege, it is no objection that the measure of taxation is found in
the income produced in part from property which of itself considered
1914: Weeks v. U.S., 232 U.S. 383. Established that illegally
obtained evidence may not be used by the court or admitted into
evidence. This case is very useful in refuting the use by the IRS of
income tax returns that were submitted involuntarily (note that these
returns must say "submitted under compulsion in violation of 5th
Amendment rights" or some such thing at the bottom.
"The effect of the 4th Amendment is to put the courts [232 U.S. 383,
392] of the United States and Federal officials, in the exercise of
their power and authority, under limitations and restraints as to the
exercise of such power and authority, and to forever secure the
people, their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against all
unreasonable searches and seizures under the guise of law. This
protection reaches all alike, whether accused of crime or not, and the
duty of giving to it force and effect is obligatory upon all intrusted
under our Federal system with the enforcement of the laws. The
tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to
obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures and enforced
confessions, the latter often obtained after subjecting accused
persons to unwarranted practices destructive of rights secured by the
Federal Constitution, should find no sanction in the judgments of the
courts, which are charged at all times with the support of the
Constitution, and to which people of all conditions have a right to
appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental rights.
The case in the aspect in which we are dealing with it involves the
right of the court in a criminal prosecution to retain for the
purposes of evidence the letters and correspondence of the accused,
seized in his house in his absence and without his authority, by a
United States marshal holding no warrant for his arrest and none for
the search of his premises. The accused, without awaiting his trial,
made timely application to the court for an order for the return of
these letters, as well or other property. This application was
denied, the letters retained and put in evidence, after a further
application at the beginning of the trial, both applications asserting
the rights of the accused under the 4th and 5th Amendments to the
Constitution. If letters and private documents can thus be seized and
held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the
protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his right to be secure
against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as
those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the
Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring
the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be
aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established be years
of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in
the fundamental law of the land. The United States marshal could only
have invaded the house of the accused when armed with a warrant issued
as required by the Constitution, upon sworn information, and
describing with reasonable particularity the thing for which the
search was to be made. Instead, he acted without sanction of law,
doubtless prompted by the desire to bring further proof to the aid of
the government, and under color of his office undertook to make a
seizure of private papers in direct violation of the constitutional
prohibition against such action. Under such circumstances, without
sworn information and particular description, not even an order of
court would [232 U.S. 383, 394] have justified such procedure; much
less was it within the authority of the United States marshal to thus
invade the house and privacy of the accused.
In Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 , 48 L. ed. 575, 24 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 372, this court said that the 4th Amendment was intended to
secure the citizen in person and property against unlawful invasion of
the sanctity of his home by officers of the law, acting under
legislative or judicial sanction. This protection is equally extended
to the action of the government and officers of the law acting under
Boyd Case, 116 U.S. 616 , 29 L. ed. 746, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 524.
To sanction such proceedings would be to affirm by judicial decision a
manifest neglect, if not an open defiance, of the prohibitions of the
Constitution, intended for the protection of the people against such
1916: Brushaber vs. Union Pacific Railroad, 240 U.S. 1. Established
that the 16th Amendment had no affect on the constitution, and that
income taxes could only be sustained as excise taxes and not as direct
"...the proposition and the contentions under [the 16th
Amendment]...would cause one provision of the Constitution to destroy
another; That is, they would result in bringing the provisions of the
Amendment exempting a direct tax from apportionment into
irreconcilable conflict with the general requirement that all direct
taxes be apportioned;
This result, instead of simplifying the situation and making clear the
limitations of the taxing power, which obviously the Amendment must
have intended to accomplish, would create radical and destructive
changes in our constitutional system and multiply confusion.
Moreover in addition the Conclusion reached in the Pollock Case did
not in any degree involve holding that income taxes generically and
necessarily came within the class of direct taxes on property, but on
the contrary recognized the fact that taxation on income was in its
nature an excise entitled to be enforced as such unless and until it
was concluded that to enforce it would amount to accomplishing the
result which the requirement as to apportionment of direct taxation
was adopted to prevent, in which case the duty would arise to
disregard form and consider substance alone and hence subject the tax
to the regulation as to apportionment which otherwise as an excise
would not apply to it.
....the Amendment demonstrates that no such purpose was intended and
on the contrary shows that it was drawn with the object of maintaining
the limitations of the Constitution and harmonizing their operation."
....the [16th] Amendment contains nothing repudiating or challenging
the ruling in the Pollock Case that the word direct had a broader
significance since it embraced also taxes levied directly on personal
property because of its ownership, and therefore the Amendment at
least impliedly makes such wider significance a part of the
Constitution -- a condition which clearly demonstrates that the
purpose was not to change the existing interpretation except to the
extent necessary to accomplish the result intended, that is, the
prevention of the resort to the sources from which a taxed income was
derived in order to cause a direct tax on the income to be a direct
tax on the source itself and thereby to take an income tax out of the
class of excises, duties and imposts and place it in the class of
Indeed in the light of the history which we have given and of the
decision in the Pollock Case and the ground upon which the ruling in
that case was based, there is no escape from the Conclusion that the
Amendment was drawn for the purpose of doing away for the future with
the principle upon which the Pollock Case was decided, that is, of
determining whether a tax on income was direct not by a consideration
of the burden placed on the taxed income upon which it directly
operated, but by taking into view the burden which resulted on the
property from which the income was derived, since in express terms the
Amendment provides that income taxes, from whatever source the income
may be derived, shall not be subject to the regulation of
1916: Stanton v. Baltic Mining, 240 U.S. 103.
Declared that the 16th Amendment conferred no new powers of taxation
to the U.S. government, but simply prevented income taxes from being
taken out of the category of indirect (excise) taxes to which they
inherently belonged. "..by the previous ruling it was settled that
the provisions of the Sixteenth Amendment conferred no new power of
taxation but simply prohibited the previous complete and plenary power
of income taxation possessed by Congress from the beginning from being
taken out of the category of indirect taxation to which it inherently
belonged and being placed in the category of direct taxation subject
to apportionment by a consideration of the sources from which the
income was derived, that is by testing the tax not by what it was -- a
tax on income, but by a mistaken theory deduced from the origin or
source of the income taxed. "
1918: Peck v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 165.
Stated that the 16th Amendment does not extend the taxing power to new
or excepted subjects, but removed the need to apportion direct taxes
The plaintiff is a domestic corporation chiefly engaged in buying
goods in the several states, shipping them to foreign countries and
there selling them. In 1914 its net income from this business was
$30,173.66, and from other sources $12,436.24. An income tax for that
year, computed on the aggregate of these sums, was assessed against it
and paid under compulsion. It is conceded that so much of the tax as
was based on the income from other sources was valid, and the
controversy is over so much of it as was attributable to the income
from shipping goods to foreign countries and there selling them.
The tax was levied under the Act of October 3, 1913, c. 16, 11, 38
Stat. 166, 172, which provided for annually subjecting every domestic
corporation to the payment of a tax of a specified per centum of its
'entire net income arising or accruing from all sources during the
preceding calendar year.' Certain fraternal and other corporations,
as also income from certain enumerated sources, were specifically
excepted, but none of the exceptions included the plaintiff or any
part of its income. So, tested merely by the terms of the act, the
tax collected from the plaintiff was rightly computed on its total net
income. But as the act obviously could not impose a tax forbidden by
the Constitution, we proceed to consider whether the tax, or rather
the part in question, was forbidden by the constitutional provision on
which the plaintiff relies.
The Sixteenth Amendment, although referred to in argument, has no real
bearing and may be put out of view. As pointed out in recent
decisions, it does not extend the taxing power to new or excepted
subjects, but merely removes all occasion, which otherwise might
exist, for an apportionment among the states of taxes [247 U.S. 165,
173] laid on income, whether it be derived from one source or another.
Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 17-19, 36 Sup.
Ct. 236, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 713, L. R. A. 1917D, 414; Stanton v.
Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103, 112-113, 36 Sup. Ct. 278.
1920: Evens v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245.
Overturned by O'Malley v. Woodrough (307 U.S. 277). Court ruled
that income taxes on federal judges were unconstitutional.
"After further consideration, we adhere to that view and accordingly
hold that the Sixteenth Amendment does not authorize or support the
tax in question. " [A direct tax on salary income of a federal judge]
1920: Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189.
Defined income within the meaning of the 16th Amendment as "profit".
Prohibited direct, unapportioned taxation of income of a stockholder.
The Sixteenth Amendment must be construed in connection with the
taxing clauses of the original Constitution and the effect attributed
to them before the amendment was adopted.
In Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 , 15 Sup. Ct.
912, under the Act of August 27, 1894 (28 Stat. 509, 553, c. 349,
it was held that taxes upon rents and profits of real estate and upon
returns from investments of personal property were in effect direct
taxes upon the property from which such income arose, imposed by
reason of ownership; and that Congress could not impose such taxes
without apportioning them among the states according to population, as
required by article 1, 2, cl. 3, and section 9, cl. 4, of the
Afterwards, and evidently in recognition of the limitation upon the
taxing power of Congress thus determined, the Sixteenth Amendment was
adopted, in words lucidly expressing the object to be accomplished:
'The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes,
from whatever source derived, without apportionment among [252 U.S.
189, 206] the several states, and without regard to any census or
As repeatedly held, this did not extend the taxing power to new
subjects, but merely removed the necessity which otherwise might exist
for an apportionment among the states of taxes laid on income.
Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 240 U.S. 1 , 17-19, 36 Sup.
Ct. 236, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 713, L. R. A. 1917D, 414;
Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103 , 112 et seq., 36 Sup.
Peck & Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 165, 172 , 173 S., 38 Sup. Ct. 432.
A proper regard for its genesis, as well as its very clear language,
requires also that this amendment shall not be extended by loose
construction, so as to repeal or modify, except as applied to income,
those provisions of the Constitution that require an apportionment
according to population for direct taxes upon property, real and
personal. This limitation still has an appropriate and important
function, and is not to be overridden by Congress or disregarded by
After examining dictionaries in common use (Bouv. L. D.; Standard
Dict.; Webster's Internat. Dict.; Century Dict.), we find little to
add to the succinct definition adopted in two cases arising under the
Corporation Tax Act of 1909 (Stratton's Independence v. Howbert, 231
U.S. 399, 415 , 34 S. Sup. Ct. 136, 140 [58 L. Ed. 285]; Doyle
v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 185 , 38 S. Sup. Ct. 467,
L. Ed. 1054]), 'Income may be defined as the gain derived from
capital, from labor, or from both combined,' provided it be understood
to include profit gained through a sale or conversion of capital
assets, to which it was applied in the Doyle Case, 247 U.S. 183, 185
, 38 S. Sup. Ct. 467, 469 (62 L. Ed. 1054).
Brief as it is, it indicates the characteristic and distinguishing
attribute of income essential for a correct solution of the present
controversy. The government, although basing its argument upon the
definition as quoted, placed chief emphasis upon the word 'gain,'
which was extended to include a variety of meanings; while the
significance of the next three words was either overlooked or
misconceived. 'Derived-from- capital'; 'the
gain-derived-from-capital,' etc. Here we have the essential matter:
not a gain accruing to capital; not a growth or increment of value in
the investment; but a gain, a profit, something of exchangeable value,
proceeding from the property, severed from the capital, however
invested or employed, and coming in, being 'derived'-that is, received
or drawn by the recipient (the taxpayer) for his separate use, benefit
and disposal- that is income derived from property. Nothing else
answers the description.
Thus, from every point of view we are brought irresistibly to the
conclusion that neither under the Sixteenth Amendment nor otherwise
has Congress power to tax without apportionment a true stock dividend
made lawfully and in good faith, or the accumulated profits behind it,
as income of the stockholder. The Revenue Act of 1916, in so far as
it imposes a tax upon the stockholder because of such dividend,
contravenes the provisions of article 1, 2, cl. 3, and article 1, 9,
cl. 4, of the Constitution, and to this extent is invalid,
notwithstanding the Sixteenth Amendment.
1922: Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20.
Prohibited Congress from legislating or controlling benefits that
employers provide to their employees. A major blow against socialism
in America! "Out of a proper respect for the acts of a co-ordinate
branch of the government, this court has gone far to sustain taxing
acts as such, even though there has been ground for suspecting, from
the weight of the tax, it was intended to destroy its subject. But in
the act before [259 U.S. 20, 38] us the presumption of validity
cannot prevail, because the proof of the contrary is found on the very
face of its provisions. Grant the validity of this law, and all that
Congress would need to do, hereafter, in seeking to take over to its
control any one of the great number of subjects of public interest,
jurisdiction of which the states have never parted with, and which are
reserved to them by the Tenth Amendment, would be to enact a detailed
measure of complete regulation of the subject and enforce it by a
socalled tax upon departures from it. To give such magic to the word
'tax' would be to break down all constitutional limitation of the
powers of Congress and completely wipe out the sovereignty of the
1924: Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47.
The Supreme Court ruled that Congress has the power to tax the income
received by a native citizen of the United States domiciled abroad
from property situated abroad and that the constitutional prohibition
of unapportioned direct taxes within the states of the union does not
apply in foreign countries.
1930: Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111.
The Supreme Court ruled that wages and compensation for personal
services were not to be taxed in their entirety, but instead, the gain
or profit derived indirectly from them.
1935: Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Railroad Company, 295 U.S.
The Supreme Court ruled that Congress that it has no constitutional
authority whatsoever to legislate for the social welfare of the
worker. The result was that when Social Security was instituted, it
had to be treated as strictly voluntary. "The catalog of means and
actions which might be imposed upon an employer in any business,
tending to the comfort and satisfaction of his employees, seems
Provisions for free medical attendance and nursing, for clothing, for
food, for housing, for the education of children, and a hundred other
matters might with equal propriety be proposed as tending to relieve
the employee of mental strain and worry.
Can it fairly be said that the power of Congress to regulate
interstate commerce extends to the prescription of any or all of these
Is it not apparent that they are really and essentially related solely
to social welfare of the worker, and therefore remote from any
regulation of commerce as such? We think the answer is plain. These
matters obviously lie outside the orbit of Congressional power."
1938: Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303.
Ruled that disputes over uncertainties in the tax code should be
resolved in favor of the taxpayer. "In view of other settled rules of
statutory construction, which teach that... if doubt exists as to the
construction of a taxing statute, the doubt should be resolved in
favor of the taxpayer..."
1939: O'Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277.
Overturned portions of Evens v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245, but not the part
about the 16th Amendment. "However, the meaning which Evans v. Gore,
supra, imputed to the history which explains Article III, 1 was
contrary to the way in which it was read by other English-speaking
courts. The decision met wide and steadily growing disfavor from
legal scholarship and professional opinion. Evans v. Gore, supra,
itself was rejected by most of the courts before whom the matter came
after that decision "
1945: Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 US 652.
Ruled that there are three distinct and separate definitions for the
term "United States". The income tax only applies to one of the three
definitions! "The term 'United States' may be used in any one of
several senses. It may be merely the name of a sovereign occupying
the position analogous to that of other sovereigns in the family of
nations. It may designate the territory over which the sovereignty of
the United States ex- [324 U.S. 652, 672] tends, or it may be the
collective name of the states which are united by and under the
1959: Flora v. United, 362 US 145.
Ruled that our tax system is based on voluntary assessment and
payment, not on force or coercion. "Our system of taxation is based
upon voluntary assessment and payment, not upon distraint."
1961: James v. United States, 366 US 213, p. 213, 6L Ed 2d 246.
Income that is taxed under the 16th Amendment must derive from a
"source". Also established that embezzled money is taxable as income.
"...the Sixteenth Amendment, which grants Congress the power "to lay
and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived."
Helvering v. Clifford, 309 US 331, 334; Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 US
1,9. It has long been settled that Congress' broad statutory
definitions of taxable income were intended "to use the full measure
of taxing power." The Sixteenth Amendment is to be taken as written
and is not to be extended beyond the meaning clearly indicated by the
language used." Edwards v. Cuba R. Co. 268 US 628, 631 [From
separate opinion by Whittaker, Black, and Douglas, JJ.] (Emphasis
1970: Brady v. U.S., 397 U.S. 742 at 748.
Supreme Court ruled that: "Waivers of Constitutional Rights not only
must be voluntary, they must be knowingly intelligent acts, done with
sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and consequences."
1975: Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648.
Supreme Court ruled that income taxes constitute the compelled
testimony of a witness: "The information revealed in the preparation
and filing of an income tax return is, for the purposes of Fifth
Amendment analysis, the testimony of a witness."
"Government compels the filing of a return much as it compels, for
example, the appearance of a `witness' before a grand jury."
1978: Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. United States, 435 U.S.
Established that wages and income are NOT equivalent as far as taxes
on income are concerned.
"Decided cases have made the distinction between wages and income and
have refused to equate the two in withholding or similar
Peoples Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 179 Ct. Cl. 318, 332, 373
F.2d 924, 932 (1967);
Humble Pipe Line Co. v. United States, 194 Ct. Cl. 944, 950, 442
F.2d 1353, 1356 (1971);
Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. United States, 194 Ct. Cl. 920, 442
F.2d 1362 (1971);
Stubbs, Overbeck & Associates v. United States, 445 F.2d 1142 (CA5
Royster Co. v. United States, 479 F.2d, at 390; Acacia
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 188 (Md. 1967)."
1985: U.S. v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605.
The production of evidence or subpoenaed tax documents cannot be
compelled. "We conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in holding
that the contents of the subpoenaed documents were privileged under
the Fifth Amendment. The act of producing the documents at issue in
this case is privileged and cannot be compelled without a statutory
grant of use immunity pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 6002 and 6003."
1991: Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192.
Held that if the defendant has a subjective good faith belief no
matter how unreasonable, that he or she was not required to file a tax
return, the government cannot establish that the defendant acted
willfully in not filing an income tax return. In other words, that
the defendant shirked a legal duty that he knew existed.
1992: United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 119 L Ed 2d 34, 112 S
Court held that income that is taxed under the 16th Amendment must
come from a "source". Congress's intent through 61 of the Internal
Revenue Code [26 USCS 61(a)]--which provides that gross income means
all income from whatever source derived, subject to only the
exclusions specifically enumerated elsewhere in the Code...and
61(a)'s statutory precursors..."
1995: U.S. v. Lopez, 000 U.S. U10287.
Establishes strict limits on the constitutional power and jurisdiction
of the federal government inside the 50 States.
"We start with first principles. The Constitution creates a Federal
Government of enumerated powers. See U.S. Const., Art. I, 8. As
James Madison wrote, "[t]he powers delegated by the proposed
Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those
which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and
indefinite." The Federalist No. 45, pp. 292-293 (C. Rossiter ed.
1961). This constitutionally mandated division of authority "was
adopted by the Framers to ensure protection of our fundamental
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (internal quotation
marks omitted). "Just as the separation and independence of the
coordinate branches of the Federal Government serves to prevent the
accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance
of power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the
risk of tyranny and abuse from either front." Ibid.
The Constitution delegates to Congress the power "[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes." U.S. Const., Art. I, 8, cl. 3. The Court,
through Chief Justice Marshall, first defined the nature of Congress'
commerce power in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 189-190 (1824):
"Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more: it is
intercourse. It describes the commercial intercourse between nations,
and parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by
prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse."
The commerce power "is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe
the rule by which commerce is to be governed. This power, like all
others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to
its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are
prescribed in the constitution." Id., at 196. The Gibbons Court,
however, acknowledged that limitations on the commerce power are
inherent in the very language of the Commerce Clause.
"It is not intended to say that these words comprehend that commerce,
which is completely internal, which is carried on between man and man
in a State, or between different parts of the same State, and which
does not extend to or affect other States. Such a power would be
inconvenient, and is certainly unnecessary.
"Comprehensive as the word `among' is, it may very properly be
restricted to that commerce which concerns more States than one. . .
. The enumeration presupposes something not enumerated; and that
something, if we regard the language or the subject of the sentence,
must be the exclusively internal commerce of a State." Id., at
For nearly a century thereafter, the Court's Commerce Clause decisions
dealt but rarely with the extent of Congress' power, and almost
entirely with the Commerce Clause as a limit on state legislation that
discriminated against interstate commerce. See, e.g., Veazie v.
Moor, 14 How. 568, 573-575 (1853) (upholding a state-created
steamboat monopoly because it involved regulation of wholly internal
commerce); Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 17, 20-22 (1888) (upholding
a state prohibition on the manufacture of intoxicating liquor because
the commerce power "does not comprehend the purely domestic commerce
of a State which is carried on between man and man within a State or
between different parts of the same State"); see also L. Tribe,
American Constitutional Law 306 (2d ed. 1988). Under this line of
precedent, the Court held that certain categories of activity such as
"production," "manufacturing," and "mining" were within the province
of state governments, and thus were beyond the power of Congress under
the Commerce Clause. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 121
(1942) (describing development of Commerce Clause jurisprudence).
Consistent with this structure, we have identified three broad
categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce
power. Perez v. United States, supra, at 150; see also Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., supra, at 276-277.
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate
commerce. See, e.g., Darby, 312 U.S., at 114 ; Heart of Atlanta
Motel, supra, at 256. "`[T]he authority of Congress to keep the
channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and injurious uses
has been frequently sustained, and is no longer open to question.'"
[quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 491 (1917)].
Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in
interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from
intrastate activities. See, e.g., Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S.
342 (1914); Southern R. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911)
(upholding amendments to Safety Appliance Act as applied to vehicles
used in intrastate commerce); Perez, supra, at 150 ("[F]or example,
the destruction of an aircraft (18 U.S.C. 32), or . . . thefts
from interstate shipments (18 U.S.C. 659)"). Finally, Congress'
commerce authority includes the power to regulate those activities
having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, Jones & Laughlin
Steel, 301 U.S., at 37 , i.e., those activities that substantially
affect interstate commerce. Wirtz, supra, at 196, n. 27.
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT CASES:
U.S. v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297, 299-300 (1977)
"Silence can only be equated with fraud when there is a legal or moral
duty to speak, or when an inquiry left unanswered would be
intentionally misleading... We cannot condone this shocking
conduct...If that is the case we hope our message is clear. This sort
of deception will not be tolerated and if this is routine it should be
Lavin v. Marsh, 644 F.2nd 1378, 9th Cir., (1981)
"Persons dealing with government are charged with knowing government
statutes and regulations, and they assume the risk that government
agents may exceed their authority and provide misinformation"
Bollow v. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 650 F.2d 1093, 9th
"All persons in the United States are chargeable with knowledge of the
Statutes-at-Large.. It is well established that anyone who deals with
the government assumes the risk that the agent acting in the
government's behalf has exceeded the bounds of his authority"
Economy Plumbing and Heating v. U.S., 470 F.2d 585 (Ct. Cl. 1972)
"Persons who are not taxpayers are not within the system and can
obtain no benefit by following the procedures prescribed for
taxpayers, such as the filing of claims for refunds."
Long v. Rasmussen, 281 F. 236, at 238
"The revenue laws are a code or a system in regulation of tax
assessment and collection. They relate to taxpayers, and not to
non-taxpayers. The latter are without their scope. No procedures are
prescribed for non-taxpayers, and no attempt is made to annul any of
their rights and remedies in due course of law. With them Congress
does not assume to deal, and they are neither the subject nor the
object of the revenue laws."
Redfield v. Fisher, 292 P. 813, 135 Or. 180, 294 P.461, 73 A.L.R.
"The individual, unlike the corporation, cannot be taxed for the mere
privilege of existing. The corporation is an artificial entity which
owes its existence and charter powers to the state; but the
individuals' rights to live and own property are natural rights for
the enjoyment of which an excise cannot be imposed."
U.S. v. Ballard, 535 F2d 400, cert denied, 429 U.S. 918, 50 L.Ed.2d
283, 97 S.Ct. 310 (1976)
"income" is not defined in the Internal Revenue Code
 The opinion is set forth in a footnote at page 160 et seq., of 3
 Printed in 157 U.S. at page 701.
"Knowledge will forever govern ignorance; and people who mean to be
their own governors, must arm themselves with the power which
knowledge gives." James Madison
-----------------------------see if any of the below are already
"Government is like a fire, useful in the fireplace, but if it gets
out of its place, it will consume everything you own," by George
"Congress has taxed INCOME, not compensation." Conner v US 303 F
Supp. 1187 (1969) "There is a clear distinction between `profit' and
wages', or a compensation for labor. Compensation for labor (wages)
cannot be regarded as profit within the meaning of the law. The word
`profit', as ordinarily used, means the gain made upon any business or
investment- - - a different thing altogether from the mere
compensation for labor."
Oliver v Halsted, 86 SE Rep. 2nd 85e9 (1955).". . .reasonable
compensation for labor or services rendered is not profit."
Lauderdale Cemetery Assoc. V Mathews, 345 PA 239; 47 A 2d 277, 280
Treasury Order 150-1, Paragraph 5 States: "US Territories and Insular
Possessions. "The commissioner shall, to the extent of authority
otherwise vested in him, provide for the administration of the United
States internal revenue law [ small i ] in the U.S. territories and
insular possessions and OTHER AUTHORIZED AREAS OF THE WORLD."
TO's 150-1 thru 150- 29 are the Delegation of authority orders for the
IRS from the Dept. Of Treasury. No section or paragraph is found in
any of these which authorize the Commissioner to administer the
internal revenue laws anywhere other than the above paragraph.
No law compels a work eligible man or woman to submit a form W-4 or W-9(or their equivalent) nor disclose an SSN as a condition of being hired or keeping one's job. With the exception of an order from a court of competent jurisdiction issued by a duly qualified judge, no amounts can be lawfully taken from one's pay (for taxes, fees or other charges) without the worker's explicit, knowing, voluntary, written consent. http://www.preferredservices.org/NonconsentualTaking.html